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Introduction 
Philosophy and science in trying to explain consciousness as a single problem assumes a physical 
monism and makes the hard problem insurmountable.  But introspective evidence shows that the 
content of consciousness (qualia) is separate from the spotlight of conscious awareness itself.  The self 
that observes the world is unaffected by the closing of eyes resulting in the blackness of the entire visual 
field, unaffected by stepping outside into the fresh morning sunlight, unaffected by dreaming and 
waking up,  unaffected by the passing of years and the change of all the atoms in the body.  The subject 
appears to be largely an enduring spectator that is not seriously impacted by major upheavals in the 
content of what it experiences.  Given this, a fundamental duality should be recognized.  Any neuro-
philosophy that conflates the two (qualia and binding) creates a single insurmountable problem. 
The hard problem can be attacked by breaking it in half as follows.  Specific configurations of matter and 
energy deterministically generate qualia according to yet to be discovered universal psychophysical 
laws.  The subjective observers that bind those qualia are like spotlights inside brains focusing attention 
onto the qualia that are already placed there by physical brain mechanisms.   Once it is admitted that 
the content of consciousness is the product of second to second neural activity but the I (or inner eye) 
viewing it is a more permanent and irreducible entity, the possibility opens for consciousness to be truly 
efficacious.  Only as a simple individual and foundational element and not a derivative of emergent 
complexity can mentality have a real executive role in decision making and a real value in evolution. 
If the content of consciousness is generated at each instant by neural activity then where does the more 
enduring conscious awareness itself come from?  That is not the focus of this paper, but I believe it was 
there all along and came from the single celled gametes from which we emerge. see 
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Mind as a non-reducible and fundamental element 
 
When we look out at the world we see birds and trees and clouds and buildings and most of these things 
appear to be both independent of each other and independent of the observer.  I close my eyes and 
then reopen them, and the buildings and trees and clouds are just as they were unaware that I was even 
there observing them.   When I close my eyes, although vision goes dark, I can still feel my body and 
hear sounds.  The sense modalities are also independent of each other.  My hearing doesn’t care that 
my vision just went black.  They all have just one thing in common; at this moment they just accidentally 
happen to be simultaneously under the gaze of my conscious awareness like separate items thrown in a 
basket.  
 
Conscious awareness seems to have a loose and disconnected relationship to the content of 
consciousness, with neither dependent on the other.  Brain scientists and neuro-philosophers have 
created an intractable problem for themselves by conflating two separate issues; how does the nervous 
system create the content of consciousness which includes independent sense modalities and 
consciousness itself which collects these events together into a whole perceptual gestalt.   
 
I contend that the creation of sense qualities is in principle not such a hard problem but does require 
new psychophysical laws to connect different forms of physical energy and vibration with the sensations 
they generate.  The observers that are capable of knowing those sense qualities as part of a perceptual 
whole is a different  problem altogether and not one that will ever be solved via any kind of 
psychophysical laws, bridging principle or emergent complexity. The reason is that subjective minds like 
electrons appear to be truly foundational elements like Leibnizian monads, part of the given simple 
array of empirical facts observed in the world from which its organization and complexity are comprised.  
 
Our objective scientific worldview today only includes a shared physical universe which can be known 
via the qualia that it generates but does not include private subjective knowers or minds as fundamental 
elements within that reality.  Nor is there any way to get to new fundamental entities from complex 
configurations of existing hypothesized fundamentals.  So to be clear there are actually two kinds of 
fundamental entities which play no part in existing physical theory: qualia and minds which perceive 
qualia simultaneously as part of a whole.  There is no reason why qualia cannot lend themselves to 
objective treatment, existing independently of minds, so we can say for example a particular sound is 
actually there when nobody is around and conversely more than one listener can simultaneously hear 
the numerically same sound.  While sensations may ultimately prove to be epiphenomenal creations of 
energy patterns generated according to deterministic law, sentient knowers of those qualia have 
properties of privacy, wholeness, identity and causal efficacy that is seems can never be subjugated to 
or understood as secondary to the complex configuration of more primal physical objects.   
 
The following thought exercise shows that there are really only two logical theories:  eliminative 
materialism and interactive dualism and while eliminative materialism is consistent it fails to explain the 
most fundamental empirical fact..the existence of phenomenal qualities.  While the same patch of red 
can in theory be viewed by from zero to n observers, observers can never observe each other for that 
would lead to infinite regress.  If there was a deterministic law saying that M configuration of matter 
produces observer O which then has no effect on the world nor can itself be observed in what way can 
we say that O even exists?  The observer O becomes an empty concept, a phantom which cannot be 
observed directly or indirectly through its behavior.  Observers which cannot be directly observed nor 
inferred from any unique contribution to objective activity vanish into nothingness.  But qualia seem to 
have no effect on anything until they are experienced by conscious beings.  The qualitative redness of 
the stoplight just shines on an empty highway intersection and affects nothing until it becomes part of 
the subjective worlds of drivers that have arrived at the intersection.  So if conscious entities are an 
empty concept which don’t exist then qualia must also not exist. In following reductive physicalism  to 
its ultimate conclusion and making subjective observers neither efficacious nor directly observable we 
have achieved eliminative materialism, a theory which fails to explain the basic perceived reality of 
sense qualities.  As a compromise alternative, emergence via complexity, fails as logically incoherent 
because minds that are not fundamental cannot really be efficacious and so disappear into nothingness 
along with qualia.  The only other alternative, one that can acknowledge that qualia and subjects 
actually exist, is interactive dualism. 
 
The content of consciousness and the existence of consciousness are separate issues and should not be 
confused.  The content of consciousness consists of sensations and sense relationships which exist in 
different modalities and include experiences, perceptions and thoughts.  There appears to be a largely 
unconscious neurological processing of information prior to that information reaching a state where it 
can be presented to the awareness of consciousness.  How sensations are generated is problem number 
one and would assume the existence of new psychophysical bridging laws through which some kind of 
physical motion generates some kind of sensation.  The brain didn’t invent these psychophysical laws 
but put them to use.  This is conceptually rather simple.  The second problem, the harder problem of 
consciousness, is known as the binding problem.  How do these sensations become known by a 
conscious observer?  This is a less simple problem and I propose requires the acceptance of the 
existence of conscious observers as fundamental atomic entities rather than derivable creations 
generated from the complex organization of physical activity.  Conscious observers are fundamental in 
that they are not the byproduct of complex organization but the elements from which organization is 
manufactured.  Conscious entities simply exist and are part of the reality we live in as are the 
fundamental particles: leptons, quarks and photons.   
 
The mind has qualities that go beyond the objective qualities of nerve signals in the brain.  It has a 
continuity and permanence that the brain itself does not have.  Hume famously looked for himself and 
saw only bundles of sensations. Sensations are fickle and fluid changing from second to second like the 
brain activity that generates them.  I close my eyes and everything goes black and then open them and 
see again, but I haven’t changed.  I step outside and all my experiences transition suddenly and 
dramatically.  But I haven’t changed.  In fact I have witnessed the transition between being inside my 
warm house and outside in the fresh air and some specious presence, duration or retention enables me 
to be directly aware of that transition happening.  Something Hume could not see, a knowing observer 
witnesses the constant changes in sensations while remaining unchanged.   
 
Subjective conscious observers have attributes that overflow a purely objective world view. Absolute 
privacy is one such added attribute. The objective world has no private boundaries.  Objective physical 
space is a continuous public field accessible to all.  But the subjective world is a discrete private universe 
with invisible walls surrounding it.  At this moment I can see what’s in my apartment where I rest on the 
couch and it is layed out as a field of vision that locates all my furniture and possessions and artwork in 
spatial relation, but I have zero direct awareness of the public space beyond the walls of my room to the 
lives living in the apartment next door or any other apartments in the city or beyond.  The objective 
universe contains everything and it is all connected in a single whole but minds are compartmentalized 
in their own self contained bounded worlds of very limited cellular awareness.   
 
Secondly that private awareness has exactly one specific privileged point of view, from one specific 
location right here and now.  There is no here and now in the objective universe, no privileged 
perspective.  So while sensations can be the purely physical end product of complex information 
processing which is largely unconscious and created by the brain, the viewer of those sensations have 
attributes that cannot be derived from completely objective brain processes.  In principle we can figure 
out hard problem number one and have an expanded science that contains psychophysical laws for 
generating sensations or qualia.  But solving hard problem number two requires recognition that 
conscious beings are fundamental entities that have absolute private boundaries and reside at specific 
locations with specific perspectives.   
 
The brain is a network of millions of neurons sending signals to each other.  The signals form circular 
feedback loops between different parts of the brain.  All of this communication and signaling creates a 
semi enclosed system of interacting parts.  But that system is never completely closed.  It is still open to 
interactions from the rest of the body and the rest of the universe.  There is no closed system in the 
physical universe, as all things interact and affect each other.  Even black holes may leak radiation.  The 
neural network is only a relatively closed system of reverberating interactions.  The subjective mental 
self is however a completely closed and private world. In my field of vision things move towards the 
boundary and suddenly disappear.  There is a hard boundary to what I can experience.  Either things 
make it into my little closed bubble of awareness or they do not.  The flashlight of awareness shines on 
things that are unexpected and have nothing to do with the fact of my existence, things that just happen 
to make it inside the shining light while just off to the side of where it shines there is no awareness at all.  
Many neuroscientists think that if we can get a very large network of neurons communicating in tight 
feedback loops the relative oneness they exhibit via the dynamic self referencing “binding” of their 
interactions will generate the absolute privacy and wholeness of a mental being.  But the pattern of 
organization in the brain is continuous with the entire physical world where energy flows without any 
real boundary while the internal world has real boundaries that are not objectively observable.    
 
Unlike relatively whole networks of synchronized neural firings, mental beings are absolute discrete self 
contained atomic cells walled off within boundaries.  Mental beings appear more like quarks as 
elemental and indivisible.  They can in theory split into two or combine into one but they cannot be 
explained as mere conglomerations of more fundamental organized subunits.  They are more likely seen 
as the atomic units, the elements from which organization is made.   We are like little subjective self 
enclosed universes; little mental worlds but we have a definite relationship with the larger universe.  We 
each have a location that at any one time gives us a unique perspective from which to view events in our 
local neighborhood.  We are situated.  Like other monads, mental beings each have a unique place in 
relationship to others.   
 
Objective science aims to portray a world that is independent of any point of view, as Nagel said “a view 
from nowhere”.   But there is no nowhere anywhere to be found, only “now-here”s.  We cannot imagine 
anything except from some particular perspective.  A map is only an imaginary view from high up.  A 
molecular model is an imaginary view from the microscopic land of the tiny.  Special relativity says that 
any measurement is from a particular frame of reference and there is no objective single correct frame 
of reference.  It may be more correct to say that objectivity is not the impossible view from nowhere but 
“the view from everywhere” – that is a collection of consistent subjectivities.  A complete understanding 
of reality must include subjective entities that look out from specific locations with unique perspectives.   
 
Our unique locations are necessary indexical attributes that distinguishes us from each other.  Even if 
brains can create selves, why would my brain continually create me and your brain continue to create 
you?  What distinguishes me from you?  One thing is our locations.  I am here in my brain, in my body in 
New York.  You are there in your brain in your body in Los Angeles.  These are new facts that have to be 
added to the world of known objective facts.  If we are identical with our brains rather than residing in a 
location within our brains there is no attribute that can distinguish us, but if we are separate entities 
with specific locations it is more correct to say we reside inside our brains.  Rather than a creation of 
other physical things, we are actually elemental mental things that have spatial relationships with other 
things.  Furthermore there is spatio-temporal continuity so I stay attached to my body and you to yours.  
Perhaps this is a mass delusion and we are switching bodies all the time while being deceived by false 
memory.  That would seem quite contrary to our own most heartfelt intuitions. 
 
Says the philosopher Thomas Nagel in The View from Nowhere: 
“One acute problem of subjectivity remains even after points of view and subjective experience are 
admitted to the real world—after the world is conceded to be full of people with minds, having thoughts, 
feelings, and perceptions that cannot be completely subdued by the physical conception of objectivity. 
The general admission still leaves us with an unsolved problem of particular subjectivity. The world so 
conceived, though extremely various in the types of things and perspectives it contains, is still centerless.  
It contains us all, and none of us occupies a metaphysically privileged position. Yet each of us, reflecting 
on this centerless world, must admit that one very large fact seems to have been omitted from its 
description: the fact that a particular person in it is himself.  What kind of fact is that? What kind of fact 
is it—if it is a fact—that I am Thomas Nagel? How can I be a particular person?” 
 
Indeed there may be many individual conscious beings at different locations but I am one of those at my 
location while you are another at your location.  The objective world contains us all, but subjectivity 
contains a fact missing about the real world:  I am at this location right here and now. 
From the neuroscientist Bjorn Merker: “This is what David Hume failed to realize when he searched his 
mind for a self and found only perceptions and bundles of perceptions.  The self he was looking for is the 
place from which he was looking.” 
As improbable as it is to ask of a law of physics to create unique cellular perspectives out of thin air 
based on configurations of matter and energy it is still not enough if we are to take Nagel seriously that 
there really is an additional indexical fact that “I am one of those perspectives”.  We cannot ask that a 
general universal law of nature would create a one single unique individual "me" as a single particular 
perspective at a particular location.   How can a general law create a single unique instance of the form 
“I am Lorenzo”, a real fact that doesn’t apply universally?   Clearly then I cannot be a derivative product 
of any physical structure and can only be understood as a primary entity, like a basic particle, in addition 
to whatever material physical structures exist.  I must be a unique citizen of the universe at a particular 
location viewing out and acting outward from a particular unique perspective. 
 
Conscious mental beings have an independence from the content of consciousness.  The mental images 
that are observed are fickle.  We turn on the light and we can see things in the room.  We open the door 
and walk out into the fresh, cool sunshine as if entering a new world.  Experiences are constantly 
changing but the experiencers that are us are fundamentally unchanged by it.  There is something about 
us that is unmoving in spite of the flux of sensations we experience.  Even after I have undergone 
anesthesia and was apparently unconscious and have no memory of the operation that happened when 
I awake it appears that I am still me...I am still the same enduring entity that slept obliviously while 
doctors probed inside my body.  It seems that I am a continuing thing at a continuing location...not 
something newly generated at every instant by the flux of reverberant networks of neuron firing. 
 
A posting from British author, scriptwriter, former medical doctor, pilot, engineer and computer 
designer Martin Woodhouse:  
“Never mind ‘replacement times’ and God’s proposed intentionality. It’s very implausible indeed that all 
the molecules which compose my brain right now — I am seventy-eight — are the same ones which went 
to make it up when I was eight. 
I’d go so far as to say that it’s highly unlikely that any of them are the same ones. 
Yet I am quite sure that I am the same person now that I was then. 
See? As so often, we don’t need appeals to abstruse or contorted philosophical thought-experiments. We 
need only look at the facts of the matter. They indicate — though they do not in themselves amount to a 
proof, I agree — that dualism represents the case and materialism is a load of old cobblers proposed by 
the philosophical equivalents of rather bright teenagers who want to look clever.” 
 
From the great brain researcher and a dualist Wilder Penfield: 
“For my own part, after years of striving to explain the mind on the basis of brain-action alone, I have 
come to the conclusion that it is simpler (and far easier to be logical) if one adopts the hypothesis that 
our being does consist of two fundamental elements... Because it seems to me certain that it will always 
be quite impossible to explain the mind on the basis of neuronal action within the brain, and because it 
seems to me that the mind develops and matures independently throughout an individual's life as 
though it were a continuing element, and because a computer (which the brain is) must be programmed 
and operated by an agency capable of independent understanding, I am forced to choose the proposition 
that our being is to be understood on the basis of two elements. This, to my mind, offers the greatest 
likelihood of leading us to the final understanding [for] which so many stalwart scientists strive.” 
 
We each exist as observers living inside a virtual world created within our own brains.  The virtual world 
in the brain is a highly complex result of transitory information processing by the neural network 
computer, but it does not create the more stable and enduring observer.  This view also agrees with the 
ideas of modern Buddhists such as the Eckhart Tolle, who see the real self as the silent and motionless 
observer of form, not to be confused with the endless and changing forms that are observed.    
We can never hope to derive the inner from the outer.  We can only accept that they are both primary 
elements of reality.  You can’t directly observe other observers.  You can only infer the existence of 
other observers from their actions.   By trying to fit subjective real primary atoms of existence as just a 
derivable subset of forms within the objective world we will always fail because the subjective observer 
is not a form, but the ability to know forms.  If you assume the world to be made only of things that can 
be known without knowers, there is no way to put knowers back as fundamental parts of the universe.   
The brain then is understood to be not the creator of the viewer in the brain but the creator of the 
virtual reality show being presented to the viewer in the brain.  The viewer has a stable personality, 
memory and knowledge that, though ghostly, transcends the rather fickle content of the movie and so 
can’t be reduced to it. That show, the movie in the brain, is not that different from the real reality out 
there in the world, just like real movies and photographs are practical because they are good copies of 
what they depict.  But the movie in the advanced human brain is an augmented virtual reality, filled with 
predictions, expectations, possibilities, imagined other points of view, and memories to provide a rich 
world of understanding, adding depth beyond the present here and now.   
Real Mental Causation 
Sensations are epiphenomenal; they occur at the end of a causal chain of physical events and register 
something that has already happened in the world.  But when they are collected into the mind of an 
observer they may become causally efficacious resulting in the beginning of a new causal chain.  For 
example, the traffic light turning from green to red is a sensation that registers a change in the world.  In 
itself it is completely neutral and epiphenomenal, just a piece of information saying something has 
happened.  But if it enters into my conscious awareness it may have a special significance to me causing 
my foot to step down on the brake.  
 
Many scientists today believe that consciousness is purely an epiphenomenon and some doubt that it 
even exists.  They do so in order to preserve causal closure (closed mindedness?) or the theory that all 
laws of nature are already known and no new forces or causes are necessary.  Since consciousness does 
not exist as part of any current physical law by definition either it doesn’t exist or the laws are 
incomplete.  Assuming consciousness does exist then it being epiphenomenal is the next closest thing in 
preserving causal closure because then it is only the end result, a dead end branch of activity in the 
physical world which causes nothing to happen.  To preserve closure epiphenomenalists say 
unconscious activities create conscious states purely as a side effect with no real force of action.  In this 
view we are robots. In other words stimulus A causes some brain activity B which causes a motor action 
C.  If activity B also happens to cause sensations such as a pain P then this is a dead end and in itself 
causes nothing.  But if P, the actual sensation of pain, has no causal significance then for what purpose 
did it evolve?   
 
Some brain scientists think that P (pain) must have survival value and causal significance but they can’t 
break free of believing in total physical closure.  They try to take a middle position saying that qualia 
such as the sensation of pain have real physical effects while at the same time they try to preserve 
causal closure of the known physical laws.  In trying to have their cake and eat it too they take an 
untenable stance that there is no need for new causal forces in nature but still think consciousness 
provides for something unique that would not be without it.  For these halfway theorists the sentient 
self is entirely a creation of neural networks while still adding something new as if the brain has created 
a Frankenstein monster having breathed life into that which it no longer seems to have complete control 
over.  That is not logically possible.  For consciousness to be an independent cause of its own and 
therefore add survival value it can’t also be completely at each instant created by and under the control 
of unconscious automatic forces.   
 
For example the neuroscientist Llinas says in his book I of the Vortex: “subjectivity or self is generated by 
the dialogue between the thalamus and the cortex; or to put it in other words, the binding events 
comprise the substrate of self. “  But he also says:  “Given the complexity of the decisions and the speed 
at which the nervous system must implement a given global strategy, the only solution that will make 
this work is one in which the animal is conscious of the particular emotional state. Why? Because 
consciousness has the great ability to focus—this is why consciousness is necessary. It is necessary 
because it underlies our ability to choose.”  There is inconsistency here that is typical of the halfway 
theorists.  If the consciousness self has any real ability to choose and any real survival significance then it 
can’t also be a complete slave of the more primary thalamocortical binding events.  Can it be that it is 
the content of consciousness and not conscious decision making itself that actually ties to the binding 
events?  For only as a true independent force of nature can consciousness really be contributing 
anything new.  Llinas seems to also believe that consciousness and sense qualities are of great 
importance and make a difference.  He even postulates that they must have existed in primitive form in 
single celled animals.  By banishing the dreaded mental “ghost in the machine”, that is mind as an 
independent force of nature not totally derived from other physical forces, how can consciousness really 
make a difference? What is so terrible about ghosts anyway?  In physics today elementary particles have 
no extension and have disappeared into localities surrounded by ghostly force fields.  At the most 
fundamental level matter has no static features and its existence is inferred as dynamic centers of 
activity.  Bertrand Russell said:  "the main point for the philosopher in the modern theory is the 
disappearance of matter as a thing.  It has been replaced by emanations from a locality – the sort of 
influences that characterize haunted rooms in ghost stories".  Perhaps we conscious beings are like 
those ghostly particles whose intrinsic nature cannot be seen but whose existence can be deduced from 
its influences. 
 
Real mental causation means minds must be real forces of nature and for that to be they must first exist 
as truly fundamental entities; real players at the table.  If mind is totally derived from other fundamental 
entities, that is quarks, electrons, etc and their chemical, neural, electrical organization according to 
known electromagnetic principles, then mind is not really a force of nature and not really efficacious.  
The idea that complexity can cause the emergence of a fundamental entity is flawed.  Emergence itself 
is only a pattern of organization of existing fundamental entities; nothing new and foundational is ever 
created; no electrons, no force of gravity, no minds can ever be created from complexity because they 
assume the very elemental pieces which are building the complexity.  If at every second complex 
feedback loops in the brain re-create the subjective self in the brain, then the brain must also be 
responsible for whatever decisions are made by that observer and real mental causation is not possible.   
 
The halfway scientists use complexity as a cover to say that minds and qualia are efficacious while at the 
same time are completely derived from the underlying real electromagnetic forces.  This position is 
incoherent.  While there is overwhelming evidence that the content of consciousness is created by 
neural activity, the more durable self through which that content is observed is not easily explained 
leaving open the possibility that minds are also players in the game.  Real mental causation requires that 
minds be forces of nature and by extension their existence can never be a mere side effect of complex 
processing by the real causal players.  A small minority of scientific theorists such as John Eccles and Karl 
Popper have speculated that there is a fundamental mentality and a true interactive dualism and that an 
expanded interpretation of quantum physics leaves room for realizing that possibility.   
 
John Gregg explains on his philosophy of consciousness site in a section on free will: 
Regardless of the particular laws governing the low-level entities in any given universe, if all things in 
that universe are either those simple low-level entities or high-level things that are nothing more than 
aggregates of the low-level entities, such that all of the behaviors and properties of the high-level 
entities fall out as inevitable consequences of the behaviors and properties of the low-level entities, then 
free will (at least as something possessed by the high-level entities) is an incoherent concept. 
The claim of free will ultimately depends upon there being some kind of holism at work in the universe. 
Specifically, for free will to exist in me, it is necessary that I am an intrinsic, inherent individual (i.e. that 
seeing me as one single thing is not just some way of looking at the pile of matter that is generally 
considered me); that whatever Nature's principles of individuation are, I count as one of Nature's 
individuals; that I am a partless whole.....If I act the way I do because of the inherent nature of the thing 
that I am, and what I am will never be repeated, one could say I obey my own custom-made law of 
nature, of which I am the only instantiation. 
 
 In spite of the argument for physical closure the evidence from common sense is overwhelming that 
there is an interactive dualism.  If I can’t hear a car approaching or can’t see the light turn red I can die.  
Can these things happen entirely in the absence of conscious sentience?  Certainly it is possible.  Maybe 
the unconscious mind has already started to step on the brakes when the light changed to red and 
before I became aware of it.  But that does not mean the conscious mind isn’t also a cause as there can 
be multiple causes contributing to motor action.  Many things happen unconsciously.  I can take the 
subway train and get to work mostly without any thinking about it but only if it follows an automatic 
routine.  If today I am taking a different path, perhaps on this day I have a dental appointment and I am 
not going to work, the thought needs to consciously occur to me that today is different or I simply take 
the automated route and end up at work.  Without some conscious thought that today is a dentist 
appointment the unconscious brain follows the robotic protocol.  Perhaps I had originally trained my 
unconscious brain to take the normal route to work or it just learned from observing me so that I didn’t 
have to pay much attention to it afterwards. 
 
Says Alexander Cairns-Smith:  “all of what we do on a time scale below a second or two is done 
unconsciously, we become conscious of these actions, if at all, only after the event.  Does this spoil the 
idea that we are conscious agents in any sense at all?  Not necessarily.  Delegating so much of our 
driving skills to a faster automatic pilot, for example, is not a serious infringement of our liberty.  We 
trained our automatic pilot and were in control then.  We exerted our conscious minds in the past, as it 
were, to be applied in future contingencies” 
For almost all animals the experience of pleasure and pain is of great importance.  Animals are able to 
act flexibly by learning to avoid things that cause pain and promote things that cause pleasure.  Why 
would the brain go through the trouble of creating the sensations of pleasure and pain if these were not 
experienced by a separate active agent that could do something about it?  The body seems to be telling 
the mind: ”I am in pain..Now stop everything and do something about it”.  It is important that the 
conscious mind may have to make a decision to override the normal course of unconscious action.  The 
mind may have to choose to ignore the pain which is normally reflexively responded to.  For instance, 
the dentist is drilling and I know that this in the long run is good for me, so I endure it.  Implied in this is 
the belief that the self that will experience the long term future benefit of enduring the pain now is the 
same continuously existing self that will benefit later. 
In The Road to Substance Dualism by Geoffrey Madell he writes 
“Is it seriously claimed that a world in which the qualitative aspect of pain was totally absent, a world in 
which no one had ever felt pain, would have been just like this one, a world in which people over the 
centuries have devised hideously painful ways of putting men and women to death, such as burning at 
the stake and being hanged, drawn and quartered? What is the current debate on whether torture is 
ever admissable about, if it is not about whether it can ever be right to inflict such horribly unpleasant 
experiences on anyone? And in contrast with the case of pain, what can we be doing on Kim’s view when 
we recommend a certain sensory experience – a scent, or a taste, say –as particularly pleasant? How can 
this be reconciled with the claim that sensations are mere epiphenomena, having no place in the causally 
determined order of the world? The attempt to hive off qualia as items which have no causal relevance is 
clearly quite misconceived.” 
Another area where it seems a sentient observer actually experiencing colors and sounds and feelings 
must have causal relevance is in artistic creation.  To think that our subjective world experienced in all 
its wholeness is not a force of nature is to take an absurd position.  Is it possible that the audio 
sensations of Beethoven actively imagining his music as he rehearsed the sounds in his head played no 
role in the creation of that music and Picasso experiencing the full emerging sensory visual gestalt of his 
creation unfolding as he painted the colors on the canvas played no role in his artistic creations? There is 
a distinct wholeness and a unique organization to the colors and sounds of each artistic expression as 
experienced by the artist that goes into the creation of the work of art.  The way the colors on the 
canvas and the notes in a song come together has an integrity that is unique and particular to the artistic 
creation.  In “Three Tricks of Consciousness: Qualia, Chunking and Selection” David Hodgson says: “I 
cannot believe that a unique work like .. Les Demoiselles is created without the artist experiencing it in its 
uniqueness and particularity, and assenting to and adopting it on the basis of that experience... “.   Can 
we really believe that the Rolling Stones created their songs without ever needing to fully experience 
hearing and feeling them?  Were those songs created by their robotic brains unconsciously without any 
requirement for real auditory feedback and revision?  If this seems quite absurd as it would to most 
people then we must accept that the mind as it experiences the wholeness of qualitative patterns is an 
independent force in nature and known electrochemical processes in the brain are inadequate to 
account for its artistic and creative decisions.   
A simple thought experiment is presented by the physicist Avshalom C. Elitzur:  “Here is a thought 
experiment for you: How about turning all your qualia off, thereby putting you to permanent 
sleepwalking? All your percepts will remain the same, hence all your actions will be the same too. No 
one, therefore, would ever notice any difference in your behavior. But your qualia would be gone, 
forever. For doing this experiment on you, you will be paid $1,000,000. Would you agree?...In physics, a 
gedankenexperiment (thought-experiment) is an indispensable tool, enabling one to anticipate 
technology by many years. Just bear in mind that physics allows the existence of humans with no qualia 
at all; and moreover that such humans are more compatible with physics than we conscious humans. So, 
again, would you agree, for that nice sum, to go into lifelong sleepwalking which will leave your observed 
behavior intact but turn off your qualia of red and blue, sorrow and joy, forever?   Well, others won’t see 
any difference, but for me it would be nothing short of death.”   Elitzer argues that the subjective observer 
is in fact making an objective difference by refusing the money.   
We need not even go to such lengths as Elitzer.  The mere fact that we are spending so much time here 
discussing consciousness must mean that consciousness has some ability to speak for itself.   Now turning 
off the speech mechanism in one part of the brain can render a person mute, but that does not mean that 
consciousness is under total control of physical processes as a damaged car would also render the driver 
incapable of driving and has no bearing on the capacity of the driver. 
Why does the brain go through the trouble of generating these internal images called thoughts if not 
that some conscious entity can do something about it?  Why do humans spend so much time with all 
this internal chatter and image making called thinking?  It seems that the brain generates images of 
future possible situations for the benefit of a conscious being that can then make informed choices 
amongst potential possibilities.   
Patricia Churchland says:  Part of the major business of nervous systems, from crayfish to humans, is to 
make good predictions about food, mates, enemies, and friends, so that the body can live on to 
reproduce. Poor predictors often end up as meals for better predictors. Imposing structure on our sensory 
stimuli in the service of better prediction is what representation is all about. Using internal 
representations allows for much more sophisticated behavior than mere stimulus-response reflexes. 
Using internal representations is a common strategy that nervous systems have developed as part of 
evolution’s way of favoring adaptive structures. The philosopher Rick Grush has developed a useful tool 
for getting a handle on this. Suppose I am running a huge construction crane, which is a very high-tech 
crane that I can operate from the comfort of my office a mile away. It would be a good idea for the 
engineer to design it so that I have access to a small-scale model that shows where the hook will be if I 
give the order for a certain movement. That way I can correct my movement without waiting for 
feedback. The emulator in my office generates internal feedback that helps me predict. Even better, the 
designer could allow me to fiddle with the model so that I can test possible movements before I choose 
the best, thereby maximizing the accuracy of the movement when I do finally make the actual hook 
move. Very crudely, this is what Grush thinks brains do. They build “emulators” of the world and of their 
bodies in that world. 
There is no doubt that this model making is a very important part of what the brain does.  But then for 
whose benefit are these representations made?  Who is manipulating the models and making decisions 
based on them if not an independent entity with its own values and desires and creative judgment?  
Perhaps there is a great deal of unconscious information processing going on in the brain but this is not 
what we usually call thinking.  Thinking happens when the unconscious information processing 
generates words and images for the benefit of a conscious observer that can then use that information 
to make informed decisions.  Scientists committed to the causal closure of the existing paradigm may 
say one unconscious module in the brain creates the internal model for the benefit of another 
unconscious module in the brain which can manipulate it.  They would say if the internal model is 
actually sensed consciously it is an epiphenomenal side effect.  But our subjective evidence is that 
creative processes involve focused effort in an internal struggle to achieve an unknown goal.  We feel 
that there is a physical involvement, care, and investment in building our internal models; an active 
effort of manipulation, feedback and deliberation. Then once constructed, as philosophers are well 
aware, we fight for our imagined model creations and defend them as if they were our children. 
 
While philosophers talk of hypothetical zombies walking around that are essentially unconscious robots 
behaving just like me or you, this is contrary to all subjective evidence.  While the brain is a great tool 
that can be trained we should not overestimate its robotic capabilities.  Consciousness has dominion 
over voluntary movement and decision making.  While movement can be largely unconscious you don’t 
see zombies or people in sleep or unconscious states walking around.  Dynamic communication and 
interaction is conscious.  While movement can be automated and taken over by unconscious robotic 
functionality we need to be conscious to make unexpected adjustments when we are walking around in 
the real world.  In the light of day it is way too important to make the intelligent second to second 
judgments of simple immediate interactions to be left to the robot and that is why we do not see an 
army of zombies out there on the street.  Our unconscious robot brains are merely automations that we 
have programmed through past conscious effort and are constantly reprogramming.  The hypothetical 
zombies are not out there walking around.  Consciousness is too important to allow us to be out and 
about in the dangerous real world without it.  In the real world those unconscious zombies are in bed in 
a vegetative state and they are not talking or interacting at all.   
 
But why do we need an independent consciousness if not that it actually adds something of survival 
value to an animal?  What real benefit can it have that the brain can’t do without it?  The answer is the 
same reason a company or a country needs a single chief executive that can see the big picture and set 
high level policy.  An organization is a complex association of potentially millions of individuals but those 
individuals have specialties and divergent opinions and priorities.  The chief executive provides a unified 
face to the outside world and resolves conflicts by having the highest level comprehensive view and 
selecting from various alternatives and then imposing its own priorities.  Think of a country where 
slightly more than half the people want to declare war.  A decision has to be made.  Either we go to war 
or we don’t.  Something has to bring an order, a coordinated, unified and consistent response in dealing 
with the world and the chief executive serves that purpose.  Says Cairns-Smith: 
….A similar analogy is sometimes made between our conscious minds and the manger of a company.  
Perhaps the manager usually only comes in once a week, if it is not raining, reads over a once-sentence 
page summary report, says ‘very good, carry on’ and then goes home.  …High level control should not 
require continuing interference.  It is more about adjusting, and making more radical changes 
occasionally when necessary.” 
Then maybe we should not think of the mind as a ghost in the machine but rather like the chief 
executive of an organization which is a collection of many living individuals cooperating towards a 
common purpose.  The chief executive is powerless without an effective organization but the 
organization lacks leadership without its director. 
